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Abstract—Physical layer network coding (PNC) has been
proposed for next generation networks. In this contribution,
we investigate PNC schemes with embedded perfect secrecy by
exploiting structured interference in relay networks with two
users and a single relay. In a practical scenario where both
users employ finite and uniform signal input distributions, we
establish upper bounds (UB) on the achievable perfect secrecy
rates and make these explicit when PAM modems are used.
We then describe two simple, explicit encoders that can achieve
perfect secrecy rates close to these UBs with respect to an
untrustworthy relay in the single antenna and single relay setting.
Lastly, we generalize our system to a MIMO relay channel where
the relay has more antennas than the users and study optimal
precoding matrices which maintain a required secrecy constraint.
Our results establish that the design of PNC transmission schemes
with enhanced throughput and guaranteed data confidentiality
is feasible in next generation systems.
Index Terms—Physical layer network coding, achievable se-
crecy rate, perfect secrecy, signal space alignment
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, the ideas of network coding [1] have beenextended to the wireless physical medium; notably, in
[2], [3], among others, the concept of harnessing interference
through structured codes was explored in the framework of
physical layer network coding (PNC). These technologies can
be proven instrumental in enabling the envisaged multi-fold
increase in data throughput in fifth generation (5G) networks
[4]. The generic PNC system model with two independent
sources and one relay is depicted in Fig. 1 and assumes that
communication is executed in two cycles. In the first cycle,
the nodes A, referred to as Alice, and B, referred to as Bob,
simultaneously transmit respective codewords to the relay node
R, referred to as Ray. In the second cycle, Ray broadcasts to
Alice and Bob a function of the total received signal; Alice and
Bob then retrieve each other’s messages by canceling off their
corresponding transmissions. Depending on the transformation
executed by Ray, one of the following relaying strategies
can be employed: amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward,
compress-and-forward [5], or the recently introduced compute-
and-forward [6] approach.
Nevertheless, despite the potential for substantial increase of
the transmission rates in wireless networks, a major obstacle in
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Fig. 1. Physical layer network coding (PNC) with two transmitter and one
relay node.
the widespread deployment of PNC and generally of relay net-
works arises due to security concerns, i.e., the confidentiality
of the exchanged data with respect to an untrustworthy relay.
A straightforward approach would be employing encryption
at upper layers of the communication network or encryption
at the physical layer [7]. However, the management of secret
keys used by crypto algorithms depends on the structure of the
access network and fourth generation systems (4G) already
have a key hierarchy of height five (5) for each individual
end-user, while there exist multiple keys in each layer of
the hierarchy [8]. Extrapolating from the experience of 4G
systems, it is expected that the management of secret keys in
5G would become an even more complicated task [9]. The
generation, management, and distribution of secret keys in
decentralized settings, such as device-to-device PNC networks,
without an infrastructure that supports key management and
authentication will impose new security challenges.
An alternative theoretical framework for the study of data
confidentiality in the physical layer of wireless networks,
dubbed as physical layer security [10]–[12], has recently be-
come a focal point of research in the wireless community. The
metric of interest, referred to as the channel secrecy capacity
is the supremum of transmission rates at which data can be
exchanged reliably while satisfying a weak secrecy [13], [14],
strong secrecy [15], or perfect secrecy constraint [16]. As an
example, let Xn be the n-length encoded version of a nR-
bit message transmitted by the source and let Zn denote the
passive eavesdropper’s information. Weak and strong secrecy
assume that the code’s blocklength n becomes arbitrarily long,
i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Zn) = 0, weak secrecy constraint, (1)
lim
n→∞ I(X
n;Zn) = 0, strong secrecy constraint. (2)
Shannon’s definition of perfect secrecy in [16] on the other
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hand explicitly assumes a finite blocklength, that is,
I(X;Z) = 0, perfect secrecy constraint. (3)
The first study of weak secrecy in relay channels with
confidential messages has appeared in [17] while further
analyses followed [18], [19]; these contributions established
that the secrecy capacity of one-way relay channels is zero,
unless the source-destination channel is better than the source-
relay channel. In essence, relay topologies of practical interest
in which the link to the relay is better than the direct link
were shown to be inherently insecure. Due to this limiting
result, subsequent work focused entirely on cooperative relay
channels with trustworthy relays, [20]–[23] to cite but a few.
However, unlike one-way relay networks, systems employ-
ing network coding can on the other hand benefit from the
simultaneity of transmissions to an untrustworthy relay to
achieve data confidentiality as noted in [24]. In essence, the
structured interference observed by the relay can be exploited
to achieve strong secrecy in the wireless transmissions [25],
[26]. In [26]–[29] the role of interference in achieving strong
secrecy was demonstrated using lattice encoders; however [27]
and [28] rely on the use of random dithering and good nested
lattice codes in arbitrarily high dimensions. In the wiretap
channel studied in [29] the superposition of the interference
to the data was viewed as a modulo addition operation, i.e.,
the superposition was assumed to take place in the code space
and not in the signal space.
In the present study, PNC networks in which Ray can
observe superpositions in the signal space (real sums of signals
transmitted by Alice and Bob as opposed to modulo sums in
the code space) are investigated in the presence of synchro-
nization errors assuming all nodes employ M -ary pulse ampli-
tude modulation (M -PAM) transceivers; this realistic scenario
is fundamentally more demanding than previously investigated
settings [23], and arguably more practical than the schemes of
[27], [28].
To separate the problem of secrecy from error correction,
we first restrict to a noiseless channel where we evaluate upper
bounds (UBs) on the achievable perfect secrecy rates, make
these explicit in the case of PAM modems, and investigate
the effect of synchronization errors on secrecy. The proposed
secret encoders in the single-input single-output (SISO) set-
ting allow Ray to obtain estimates of linear combinations
of the transmitted PAM symbols but not to retrieve any of
the secret bits they carry, thus achieving perfect secrecy,
i.e., zero information leakage per PAM symbol. Finally, our
system model is extended to the multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) case in which we study optimal precoding matrices
which achieve the required signal alignment at the relay,
while preserving secrecy. Our study differs from earlier work
on interference alignment for secrecy [30], [31], [32] and
interference alignment for the MIMO channel [33] in that the
required secrecy conditions demand equality of matrices rather
than just of the subspaces generated by their columns.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the SISO
system model is presented and we propose upper bounds
(UBs) on the achievable perfect secrecy rates of the noiseless
SISO system given finite constellations. In Section III we
provide explicit formulas for these bounds in the case of PAM
modems, demonstrate that the user with the smaller PAM
constellation can transmit no secret bits without knowledge
of the other user’s symbol, and further discuss the impact of
synchronization errors on the upper bounds. In Section IV two
explicit encoders achieving perfect secrecy are constructed,
the first assuming no cooperation between the users, and the
second assuming that the user of the smaller constellation
knows the signal transmitted by the other user. The achievable
rates in both approaches are shown to be close to the upper
bound. In Section V we generalize our setup to a noisy
MIMO channel in which the users and the relay have multiple
antennas, and study optimal precoding matrices. Finally in
Section VI the conclusions of this contribution are drawn and
future directions of the work are discussed.
II. SECURE PNC SYSTEM MODEL
Communication between Alice and Bob with the help of
Ray takes place in two cycles as depicted in Fig. 1. In
what follows, we use the subscript A to denote quantities
and variables (source symbols, codewords, etc.) corresponding
to Alice and the subscript B for those belonging to Bob.
All channel coefficients and encoding/decoding algorithms are
public, i.e., known by Alice, Bob, and Ray. Lower case letters
denote realizations of respective random variables that are
represented with the corresponding upper case letters, e.g., x
denotes a realization of the random variable X with probability
mass function (pmf) pX(x). The corresponding script letter X
denotes the support of X , that is, the set of all x for which
pX(x) is non-zero.
We assume that Alice and Bob’s source symbols (secret
messages) are drawn from discrete alphabets. Under an aver-
age power constraint, the use of Gaussian encoders has been
demonstrated to achieve the secrecy capacity of the interfer-
ence channel [34]. However when transmission is constrained
by a joint amplitude-variance constraint1 it has been shown
that the capacity is on the contrary achieved by employing
codebooks of finite size; a recent extension of these results
in the wiretap channel has shown that this holds true for
the secrecy capacity as well [35]. Due to this reason, in the
following we exclusively operate under the assumption that all
codebooks have finite size.
We start by examining the scenario in which all nodes
have single antennas while the multi-antenna case will be
covered in a later section. In the present work we separate
the design of secrecy encoders from error-correction encoding.
The reason we propose this approach is that in the noiseless
PNC setting it is possible to achieve perfect secrecy without
introducing any delay, i.e., secrecy is achieved on a per-symbol
basis. Additionally, the proposed schemes do not rely on the
existence of noise to increase the equivocation at Ray but
rather on structured interference, i.e. the structure of the pmf
modeling the observation at Ray. While a realistic system
would of course employ some form of error-correction, we
omit an outer error-correcting code from our system model
1Under this realistic assumption the amplitude of the transmitted signals is
bounded, as in all actual communication systems.
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Fig. 2. Encoder for perfect secrecy in PNC systems: Alice encodes a secret message sA into a codeword xA using a secrecy encoder. Bob decodes the
transmission from Ray to obtain an estimate sˆA of the secret message transmitted by Alice.
for brevity. Alternatively, one is free to assume that the secret
symbols in our system model are the output of some powerful
error-correcting code (e.g. turbo or LDPC code); the results
herein would remain identical.
A. First Transmission Cycle
We consider finite alphabets SA, SB of secret messages to
be transmitted by Alice and Bob, respectively, according to the
pmfs of random variables SA, SB . The secret messages are
encoded in codewords belonging to finite constellations XA,
XB ⊂ C as follows. We set MA = |XA|, MB = |XB |, and
mA = log2MA, mB = log2MB .
Encoding proceeds by first defining labeling functions
bA : XA → SA ∪ {ε} (4)
bB : XB → SB ∪ {ε} (5)
where ε represents the empty string. We assume that bA and bB
are surjective onto SA and SB , respectively, so that every po-
tential secret message is encoded in some constellation point.
For any sA ∈ SA∪{ε} we set b−1A (sA) = {xA | bA(xA) = sA}
and similarly for any sB ∈ SB ∪ {ε}. The above labeling
functions define probabilistic encoding functions ϕA, ϕB
as follows. For sA ∈ SA ∪ {ε} we define ϕA(sA) to be
uniformly distributed over the set b−1A (sA), and ϕB is defined
analogously. Thus to transmit sA ∈ SA ∪ {ε}, Alice chooses
from b−1A (sA) uniformly at random and transmits the chosen
xA. Identical remarks apply to Bob. As such, we have random
variables XA and XB which model the frequency with which
symbols xA and xB are transmitted.
Assuming perfect synchronization at Alice and Bob, Ray’s
observation is modeled by
Y = hAXA + hBXB +WR = XR +WR (6)
where hA (respectively hB) is the channel (fading) coefficient
in the link from Alice (Bob) to Ray, XR = hAXA + hBXB ,
and WR is the noise at Ray, a complex circularly symmetric
zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ2R.
B. Second Transmission Cycle
In the second cycle of the communication, Ray wraps the
PNC observation y using a mapping f : Y → Z (e.g., possible
options for this mapping include “compress-and-forward” and
“compute-and-forward”). We assume that f is invertible given
either xA or xB , that is, that Alice can recover y from z given
that she knows xA, and similarly for Bob. An obvious choice
is to select Z = Y and have f be the identity function, i.e.,
Ray forwards exactly what he receives.
Finally, Ray transmits z = f(y) to Alice and Bob, whose
observations are modeled by
YA = h˜AZ +WA, (7)
YB = h˜BZ +WB , (8)
where h˜A (respectively h˜B) is the channel (fading) coefficient
from Ray to Alice (Ray to Bob), and WA (WB) is the noise
at Alice (Bob), a complex circularly symmetric zero-mean
Gaussian random variable with variance σ2A (σ
2
B).
Given some observation yA ∈ YA at Alice, she estimates
Bob’s transmitted secret message sB as follows. From yA she
applies some maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding algorithm
to produce an ML estimate zˆ of z from equation (7). With
knowledge of xA, she can invert the wrapping function f to
produce an estimate yˆ of Ray’s observation. With knowledge
of hA and xA, she then produces an ML estimate of xˆB from
yˆ − hAxA, and decodes Bob’s secret message by computing
sˆB = bB(xˆB). Bob estimates Alice’s transmitted secret
message in an identical manner.
C. Perfect Secrecy and an Upper Bound on the Secrecy Rate
Perfect secrecy can be achieved with respect to Ray if the
mutual information between Ray’s observation and the secret
source symbols is zero, i.e.,
I(Y ;SA) = 0, perfect secrecy condition for Alice (9)
I(Y ;SB) = 0, perfect secrecy condition for Bob. (10)
The input and output random variables in the PNC system
model form respective Markov chains SA → XA → XR →
Y and SB → XB → XR → Y . As a result, due to the
data processing inequality, to satisfy conditions (9) and (10)
it suffices to show that
I(XR;SA) = 0, sufficient condition for (9), (11)
I(XR;SB) = 0, sufficient condition for (10). (12)
Given some fixed encoder and assuming equations (11)
and (12) are satisfied, we denote by RsA and R
s
B the cor-
responding secrecy rates2. Loose upper bounds on RsA and
RsB are imposed by the capacity in the link Alice-Ray-Bob,
i.e., RsA ≤ I(XA;YB |XB) and RsB ≤ I(XB ;YA|XA). The
following proposition imposes an alternative upper bound on
the secrecy rates, based on Ray’s inherent inability to decode
the corresponding secret messages.
2As the messages are delivered over two transmission cycles, one should
potentially multiply all rates and bounds by 1
2
; however we omit this factor
for clarity as it does not affect the nature of our results.
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Proposition 1: Suppose that conditions (9) and (10) are
satisfied. Then the perfect secrecy rates are bounded by
RsA ≤ R̂sA and RsB ≤ R̂sB , where
R̂sA = I(XA;YB |XB)− I(XA;Y ) + δA (13)
R̂sB = I(XB ;YA|XA)− I(XB ;Y ) + δB . (14)
with δA = H(XA|YB , XB) and δB = H(XB |YA, XA).
Proof: We will only prove the inequality RsA ≤ R̂sA, as
the proof of RsB ≤ R̂sB is completely analogous. Since we
demand perfect secrecy, the transmission rate is upper bounded
by Ray’s equivocation, i.e., RsA ≤ H(SA) = H(SA|Y ).
Moreover, H(XA|XB) = H(XA) since XA and XB are
independent. Therefore,
RsA ≤ H(SA|Y )
= H(SA, XA|Y )−H(XA|Y, SA)
= H(XA|Y ) +H(SA|XA, Y )−H(XA|Y, SA)
= H(XA|Y )−H(XA|Y, SA)
≤ H(XA|Y )
= H(XA|Y )−H(XA) +H(XA) + δA − δA
= H(XA|XB)−H(XA|YB , XB)− I(XA;Y ) + δA
= I(XA;YB |XB)− I(XA;Y ) + δA (15)
and the proposition follows.
Intuitively, the difference I(XA;YB |XB)− I(XA;Y ) mea-
sures Ray’s equivocation with respect to XA. On the other
hand, the term δA measures Bob’s failure to decode Alice’s
secret messages. By Fano’s inequality δA can be made small
when error correction is employed, while in the noiseless
scenario δA = δB = 0.
III. UPPER BOUNDS IN THE NOISELESS SCENARIO
Throughout this section and the next we assume that
(i) the random variables XA and XB are uniform, and
(ii) all channels are fixed and invertible.
When channel state information is globally available, we
assume that Alice and Bob employ channel precoders, denoted
respectively by gA and gB , such that
hAgA = hBgB (16)
so that Ray observes
y = hAgAxA+hBgBxB+wR = hAgA(xA+xB)+wR. (17)
Ray now attempts to recover the sum xA + xB . The secrecy
of our proposed encoders depends only on the structure of the
sum xA + xB , so we set σ2R = 0 in the next two sections. In
this noiseless environment, Ray can post-multiply the received
signal in (17) by (hAgA)−1 to recover xA + xB exactly.
Similarly, the Ray-Alice and Ray-Bob channels are assumed
noiseless. We summarize by adding a third assumption:
(iii) All channel gains are equal to unity and all noise sources
are zero, that is, hA = hB = h˜A = h˜B = 1 and σ2A =
σ2B = σ
2
R = 0.
While (iii) may seem unrealistic, we are rather interested
in the achievable perfect secrecy rates based solely on the
structure of the sum xA + xB itself. Thus while the presence
of noise and fading can have a deteriorating effect on Alice
and Bob’s secrecy rates, removing assumption (iii) will not
affect perfect secrecy relative to Ray. More precisely, provided
that (16) is satisfied, our encoding schemes will guarantee that
the secrecy conditions (11) and (12) are satisfied regardless of
the value of σ2R. Hence assumption (iii) streamlines exposition
and emphasizes the fact that we are not relying on a degraded
channel to provide secrecy.
Finally, we note that although channel inversion is impracti-
cal in Rayleigh environments, it can be employed whenever a
line of sight (LOS) exists between either transmitter and Ray,
i.e., whenever a Rician, a Nakagami-m or other large scale
fading channel model [36] is applicable. We will return to
the question of designing optimal precoders gA and gB in the
presence of noise in Section V.
A. An Upper Bound on the Achievable Perfect Secrecy Rates
In the noiseless setting with unit channel gains, the set of
all possible observations at Ray is
Y = XR = {xA + xB | xA ∈ XA, xB ∈ XB} (18)
which comes with an addition function
ψ : XA ×XB → Y, ψ(xA, xB) = xA + xB . (19)
Crucial to our analysis are the sets
ψ−1(y) = {(xA, xB) | y = xA + xB}. (20)
The pmf of Y is given by the convolution of the pmfs of XA
and XB , which is clearly seen to be
pY (y) =
∑
xA,xB
xA+xB=y
pXA(xA)pXB (xB) =
|ψ−1(y)|
MAMB
. (21)
The following proposition gives a compact, intuitive upper
bound on the achievable secrecy rates R̂sA and R̂
s
B .
Proposition 2: In the noiseless scenario R̂sA and R̂
s
B are
equal. Furthermore, denoting R̂s = R̂sA = R̂
s
B , we have
R̂s =
1
MAMB
∑
y∈Y
|ψ−1(y)| log2 |ψ−1(y)| (22)
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the noiseless scenario we therefore simply define R̂s to
be the perfect secrecy rate UB. Intuitively, for a given y ∈
Y , log2 |ψ−1(y)| measures equivocation at Ray in bits, and
therefore controls the total number of secret bits that Alice
and Bob can transmit when Ray observes y. However, Alice
and Bob do not necessarily a priori know the value of y. We
will return to this point in Section IV.
B. An Upper Bound on the Achievable Perfect Secrecy Rates
for PAM Modems
Let us now study a familiar scenario in which XA and XB
are, respectively, MA- and MB-PAM constellations, so that
XA is the uniform distribution on
XA = {−(MA−1),−(MA−3), . . . ,MA−3,MA−1} (23)
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Fig. 3. The pmf of Ray’s observation y = xA+xB in the noiseless scenario
with channel gains hA = hB = 1. Here Alice employs a 4-PAM modulator
and Bob a 16-PAM modulator.
and similarly for XB . Throughout this section we assume that
MB ≥MA.
Proposition 3: In the noiseless setting with unit channel
gains when Alice and Bob employ MA-PAM and MB-PAM
modulators with MB ≥MA, we have
|ψ−1(y)| =
0 y odd or |y| ≥MB +MA,
MB+MA−|y|
2 MB −MA + 2 ≤ |y| ≤MB +MA − 2,
MA |y| ≤MB −MA.
Proof: This is a straightforward calculation and is there-
fore omitted.
The above proposition in conjunction with (21) allows us
to explicitly describe Ray’s pmf pY (y). In Fig. 3 we plot the
values of |ψ−1(y)| for MA = 4 and MB = 16.
Theorem 1: In the noiseless setting with unit channel
gains when Alice and Bob employ MA-PAM and MB-PAM
modulators with MB ≥MA, we have
R̂s = mA
MB −MA + 1
MB
+
2
MAMB
MA−1∑
a=1
a log2(a). (24)
In particular, for fixed MA we have limMB→∞ R̂
s = mA.
Proof: See Appendix B.
While Theorem 1 provides an explicit upper bound on RsA
and RsB when Alice and Bob employ PAM modems, the
following proposition shows that given the current encoder
description, the user with the smaller constellation can transmit
no secret bits.
Proposition 4: Suppose that Alice and Bob employ PAM
modems with MB ≥ MA. Then RsA = 0. In particular, if
MA = MB then RsA = R
s
B = 0.
Proof: Let us pick some xA ∈ XA with sA = bA(xA) and
sA 6= ε. That is, we pick some constellation point xA which
encodes a genuine secret message. Now set xB = −xA, and
x′B = MB −MA + 2 − xA if xA > 0 and x′B = −(MB −
MA + 2) − xA if xA < 0. One can check easily that the
assumption MB ≥ MA guarantees that xB and x′B are well-
defined points in XB . Let y = xA+xB = 0 and y′ = xA+x′B .
Using Proposition 3, one sees easily that
|ψ−1(y)| = MA and |ψ−1(y′)| = MA − 1. (25)
The perfect secrecy condition I(SA;Y ) = 0 implies that
p(sA|y) = p(sA) = p(sA|y′). From the above two equations,
it is clear that we can write
p(sA|y) = k
MA
, p(sA|y′) = k
′
MA − 1 (26)
for some positive integers k, k′, neither of which is zero. From
p(sA|y) = p(sA|y′) we arrive at kMA = k
′
MA−1 , or equivalently
(k − k′)MA = k. This implies that MA divides k, which is
only possible if MA = k and hence p(sA) = p(sA|y) = 1.
The proposition follows.
While the above proposition shows that it is impossible for
Alice to transmit secret bits, the same is not true of Bob, as
there exist points xB ∈ XB for which |ψ−1(xA+xB)| = MA
for all xA ∈ XA. Thus the above result is specific to the
smaller of the two constellations.
C. Effect of Time Synchronization Errors on the Upper Bounds
One of the main issues in PNC networks is that the assump-
tion of perfect time synchronization is too optimistic. In this
subsection we investigate the effect of time synchronization on
R̂sA and R̂
s
B when Alice and Bob employ M -PAM modulators.
In this case the analog signals transmitted by Alice and Bob,
denoted by tA(t), and tB(t) respectively, can be expressed as:
tA(t) =
∞∑
l=−∞
xA(l) cos(2pift)g(t− lT − δTA), (27)
tB(t) =
∞∑
l=−∞
xB(l) cos(2pift)g(t− lT − δTB), (28)
where T is the symbol period, δTA and δTB denote the
synchronization errors at Alice and Bob respectively and are
assumed to be uniformly distributed in the range [0, T ] and
g(t) denotes the transmitter filter (commonly implemented
as a raised cosine filter). Here for simplicity we assume
that the transmitter filter is a simple rectangular window of
length equal to the symbol period T . Neglecting all other
noise sources and assuming that Ray employs a matched filter
receiver implemented as a standard correlator receiver, Ray’s
observation y(l) during the l-th symbol can be expressed as
y(l) =
2
T
∫ 0
−δTA
xA(l − 1) cos2(2pift)dt
+
2
T
∫ T−δTA
0
xA(l) cos
2(2pift)dt
+
2
T
∫ 0
−δTB
xB(l − 1) cos2(2pift)dt
+
2
T
∫ T−δTB
0
xB(l) cos
2(2pift)dt
= (1− α)xA(l) + (1− β)xB(l) + αxA(l − 1)
+ βxB(l − 1), (29)
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Fig. 4. Numerical evaluation of R̂sA in the presence of time synchronization
errors denoted by δTA and δTB . The symbol period is normalized to unity
T = 1, and we set MA = 4 and MB = 8. In the evaluation of R̂sA we
assume that all the history in XB is available.
where
α =
sin
(
4pi δTAT
)
4pi
+
δTA
T
, (30)
β =
sin
(
4pi δTBT
)
4pi
+
δTB
T
. (31)
As a result of time synchronization errors, Alice’s and
Bob’s symbols are misaligned when reaching Ray. We note
that in this case the symmetry between R̂sA and R̂
s
B is lost
due to the existence of interference that also depends on the
history of the transmitted codewords (both the current l-th
codeword and the previous (l − 1)-th codeword as indicated
in (29)). We investigate the effect of this misalignment by
numerically evaluating R̂sA when all the history on XB is
available and R̂sB when all the history on XA is available.
The results are depicted in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively, when
MA = 4 and MB = 8, averaged over 10, 000 runs. It
is evident that the impact of similar synchronization errors
on the smallest constellation is more acute. For relatively
small synchronization errors the effect on R̂sA is negligible;
on the contrary R̂sB is more sensitive to this effect and
sharply decreases. On the other hand, as the synchronization
errors increase their impact becomes increasingly important.
Interestingly, due to the sinusoidal parts of α and β, there
are four regions of values of (δTA, δTB) – around the points(
1
4 ,
1
4
)
,
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
,
(
3
4 ,
3
4
)
and (1, 1) – in which the decrease in
R̂sA and R̂
s
B is more acute.
IV. EXPLICIT ENCODER CONSTRUCTION WITH PAM
MODEMS IN THE NOISELESS SCENARIO
Throughout this section we assume that Alice and Bob use
PAM modems of sizes MA and MB , with MB ≥ MA. We
retain the assumptions of the previous section that all channels
are noiseless and all channel gains are set to unity.
We assume in the first subsection that neither Alice nor
Bob has any information about the other’s symbol prior to
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Fig. 5. Numerical evaluation of R̂sB in the presence of time synchronization
errors denoted by δTA and δTB . The symbol period is normalized to unity
T = 1, and we set MA = 4 and MB = 8. In the evaluation of R̂sB we
assume that all the history in XA is available.
transmission; that is, that the labeling function bB : XB →
SB ∪ {ε} as defined in (5) (and hence, Bob’s encoding
function) is independent of the symbol transmitted by Alice.
By Proposition 4, the same condition at Alice implies that
RsA = 0, and furthermore that R
s
B = 0 if MB = MA. Hence
we assume in Section IV-A that MB > MA and only construct
an explicit secret bit encoder at Bob in this case. We then
compute the corresponding perfect secrecy rate and compare
the result to the upper bound of the previous section.
In the second subsection we study Alice’s achievable se-
crecy rate when she has knowledge of xB prior to the
transmission of this symbol by Bob. This requires a slight
generalization of the system model to one where Alice’s
labeling function bA can depend on both xA and xB . While the
assumption that Alice knows Bob’s signal may be unrealistic
in some scenarios, one can think that in this case Bob plays
the role of a helping interferer whose signal is known to Alice.
A. Explicit Encoder Construction at Bob
Under the assumption MB ≥MA, Proposition 4 guarantees
that RsA = 0, and hence if MB = MA we have by symmetry
that RsB = 0 as well. Thus we make the slightly stronger
assumption that MB > MA in this subsection.
To construct our encoding function at Bob, we first define
his set of secret source symbols to be SB = {0, 1}mA and SB
to be uniform on this set. We define a subset X sB of XB on
which Bob will transmit secret bits, by setting
X sB = {xB ∈ XB | |xB | ≤MB − 2MA − 1}. (32)
It follows from Proposition 3 that for all xB ∈ X sB we have
|ψ−1(xA + xB)| = MA for all xA ∈ XA. (33)
A simple computation shows that |X sB | = MB − 2MA. Note
that since MA and MB are powers of two, the assumption
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MB > MA is equivalent to MB ≥ 2MA. Thus X sB is well-
defined provided that MB > MA, but is empty in the extreme
case MB = 2MA.
The set X sB is maximal in the sense that X sB is the largest
subset of XB on which Ray is guaranteed to experience the
maximum number of bits of equivocation, namely mA, and
whose cardinality is divisible by MA. This latter condition is
necessary to maintain the assumed uniformity of the binary
input distribution of secret bits.
Our bit labeling procedure for XB can be described picto-
rially by a perfect binary tree as in Fig. 6. Each point in XB
is assigned in increasing order to a leaf in the perfect binary
tree with MB leaves. The edges at each level of the tree are
alternately labeled with a 0 or a 1. A point xB is then given a
bit labeling l(xB) by tracing the tree downwards from the root
node to the corresponding leaf, so that the bit closest to the
root node is the left-most bit in the string. For the example in
Fig. 6 with MB = 16, we have the bit labelings l(−5) = 0101,
l(+7) = 1011, etc.
We now declare the last mA bits of all xB ∈ X sB to be
secret, and all other bits to be public. Thus Bob’s labeling
function bB : XB → SB ∪ {ε} is defined by
bB(xB) =
ß
the last mA bits of l(xB) xB ∈ X sB
ε xB 6∈ X sB (34)
To transmit some sB ∈ SB ∪ {ε}, recall that Bob chooses
uniformly from among the set b−1B (sB). Thus Bob transmits
sB with frequency 1MA
|X sB |
|XB | if sB ∈ SB , and with frequency
1− |X sB ||XB | if sB = ε. It follows that each element of XB is sent
with frequency 1MB , so that XB is uniform as desired. Alice
simply samples XA uniformly at random.
Theorem 2: Suppose that MB > MA. Perfect secrecy is
preserved given the above encoder, that is, I(SB ;Y ) = 0.
Furthermore, the secrecy rate at Bob obtained using the present
strategy is given by
RsB = mA
MB − 2MA
MB
(35)
In particular, for fixed MA we have limMB→∞R
s
B = mA.
Proof: To prove that I(SB ;Y ) = 0, we must prove that
p(sB |y) = p(sB) whenever p(sB , y) > 0. Suppose sB ∈ SB
and that Ray observes some y such that p(sB , y) > 0. Then
we have that |ψ−1(y)| = MA by the construction of bB . Given
that Ray observed y, define
XB(y) = {xB | xA + xB = y for some xA ∈ XA} (36)
to be the set of all xB Bob could have transmitted.
First observe that XB(y) necessarily consists of MA con-
secutive points in XB . But by the construction of bB , in any
set of MA consecutive points in XB there exists at most one
xB such that bB(xB) = sB . If p(sB , y) > 0 then there exists
exactly one such xB , proving that p(sB |y) = 1MA = p(sB).
Thus perfect secrecy is preserved.
As Bob transmits mA secret bits uniformly at random
whenever xB ∈ X sB and no secret bits otherwise, his secrecy
rate is given by
RsB = mA
|X sB |
|XB | (37)
which is easily seen to be equal to the stated quantity.
Note that for sB ∈ SB we used the fact that p(sB) = 1MA in
the theorem, while Bob actually transmits this bit string with
the smaller frequency 1MA
|X sB |
|XB | . This apparent discrepancy is
due to the fact that for the purposes of measuring secrecy
with respect to Ray, we are not concerned with the resulting
distribution on SB ∪ {ε} since secrecy is not relevant when
Bob transmits the empty secret string ε. Put another way, Ray
can possibly obtain non-trivial information about whether or
not sB ∈ SB , but provided that sB ∈ SB the above encoder
guarantees perfect secrecy.
To encode queues of public and secret bits, Bob begins at
the root node of the tree and travels downwards, encoding
public bits until he hits a node all of whose descending edges
correspond to secret bits. He then switches to his queue of
secret bits and begins encoding those, until the constellation
point to be sent is completely determined.
Example 1: Let us set MA = 4 and MB = 16, and suppose
that Bob wishes to transmit the public and secret (respectively)
bit queues
QpB = 10110101, QsB = 1111 (38)
He begins by encoding the left-most bits in QpB , namely 10, at
which point the first two bits in QsB (namely 11) determine the
final decision in the tree. The first constellation point to be sent
is therefore xB = +7, corresponding to the bit string 1011.
He continues in this way, finally determining the symbols for
transmission to be
1011→ +7 = xB(1)
1101→ +11 = xB(2)
0111→ −1 = xB(3)
(39)
where xB(i) is sent during the ith time instance. 
Let us study the effectiveness of this scheme by comparing
RsB to the upper bound R̂
s. We define
∆B = |R̂s −RsB |, B = ∆B/R̂sB (40)
to measure the absolute and relative failure of RsB to obtain the
upper bound. In Fig. 7 we measure ∆B for various values of
MB ≥ 4MA, and do the same for B in Fig. 8. As one can see
from the plots, we have ∆B → 0 and B → 0 as MB → ∞
and MA stays fixed. Indeed, this is easily provable using the
explicit expressions for RsB and R̂
s. We see from Fig. 7 that
when MB = 4MA, for example, the gap ∆B increases with
MB , but that the relative gap B is approximately constant
with increasing MB and MA = MB/4.
B. Explicit Encoder Construction at Alice with Side Informa-
tion
In this subsection we generalize our system model slightly
to allow Alice to have prior knowledge of the symbol xB
transmitted by Bob. While this may not be realistic in some
practical scenarios, we have seen by Proposition 4 that given
no knowledge of Bob’s symbol, Alice’s perfect secrecy rate is
zero when both employ PAM modems with MB ≥MA.
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Fig. 6. Secret bit encoder at Bob for MA = 4 and MB = 16, where secret bits are denoted in red and public bits in black. Bob transmits mA secret bits
on the subset X sB = {−7, . . . ,+7} of XB .
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Fig. 7. The gap ∆B = |R̂s − RsB | between Bob’s secrecy rate given the
encoding scheme of Section IV-A and the upper bound R̂s, as a function of
MB for various values of MB ≥ 4MA.
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In what follows we let SA = {0, 1}mA and SA be the
uniform random variable on this set. We define Alice’s bit
labeling by a function
bA : XA ×XB → SA ∪ {ε} (41)
where XA and XB are MA-PAM and MB-PAM constellations,
respectively. Here the value sA = bA(xA, xB) should be
xB
xA
−7 −5 −3 −1 +1 +3 +5 +7
+3 00 00 00 00 00 ε ε ε
+1 ε 01 01 01 01 01 ε ε
−1 ε ε 11 11 11 11 11 ε
−3 ε ε ε 10 10 10 10 10
Fig. 9. The bit labeling bA : XA × XB → {0, 1}mA ∪ {ε} for MA = 4
and MB = 8. Secret bits are depicted in red, and are transmitted exactly
when |ψ−1(xA + xB)| = MA.
interpreted as the secret symbol encoded in xA, provided that
Bob transmits xB .
The encoder is similar to the one proposed in the previous
subsection. Alice labels each of her points xA with a unique
bit string l(xA) ∈ {0, 1}mA of length mA. Given a symbol
xB to be transmitted by Bob, we define bA by
bA(xA, xB) =
ß
l(xA) if |ψ−1(xA + xB)| = MA
ε otherwise (42)
In other words, for a given xB all of the bits encoded in xA
are secret provided that |ψ−1(xA + xB)| = MA; otherwise
Alice transmits no secret bits. We depict the labeling bA in
the case of MA = 4 and MB = 8 in Fig. 9.
Given some secret message sA to be transmitted and prior
information about the codeword xB to be transmitted by Bob,
Alice picks the unique xA such that l(xA) = sA. If |ψ−1(xA+
xB)| = MA, then she transmits xA and therefore sends the
secret message sA to Bob. If |ψ−1(xA+xB)| < MA, she then
picks some x′A 6= xA uniformly at random and transmits this
x′A, sending the empty string ε to Bob. It follows from the
uniformity of SA and XB that XA is uniform as well.
Theorem 3: Suppose that MB ≥ MA. Perfect secrecy is
preserved given the above encoder, that is, I(SA;Y ) = 0.
Furthermore, the secrecy rate at Alice obtained using the
present strategy is given by
RsA = mA
MB −MA + 1
MB
. (43)
In particular, for fixed MA we have limMB→∞R
s
A = mA.
Proof: For y ∈ Y we set
XA(y) = {xA | xA + xB = y for some xB ∈ XB}. (44)
Given some sA ∈ SA such that p(sA, y) > 0, then |ψ−1(y)| =
MA as Alice only transmits secret bits if she knows Ray will
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experience the maximal amount of entropy. Thus XA(y) = XA
whenever Alice transmits secret bits. Since every xA ∈ XA is
assigned a unique bit string, it follows easily that p(sA|y) =
1
MA
= p(sA) and hence we have perfect secrecy.
To calculate the rate, we need to calculate the number of
pairs (xA, xB) for which |ψ−1(xA + xB)| = MA. For a
fixed xA, one can compute easily using Proposition 3 that
this number is MB −MA + 1, thus the total number of such
pairs is MAMB −M2A + MA. The total number of all pairs
(xA, xB) is of course MAMB , from which we calculate the
secrecy rate to be
RsA = mA
MAMB −M2A +MA
MAMB
(45)
which is equal to the quantity stated in the theorem.
As before, note that Ray will know whether or not Alice
transmitted secret bits, based on the value of |ψ−1(y)| which
is, of course, available to Ray. But provided that Alice
transmits secret bits, Ray will have no information about the
specific transmitted bit string.
Example 2: Suppose that we set MA = 4 and MB = 8, and
use the encoder depicted in Fig. 9. Let us suppose that Alice
wishes to transmit the queue
QsA = 1011 (46)
of secret bits, and that she knows in advance that xB(1) = +7,
xB(2) = −5, and xB(3) = +5. She begins at the two left-
most bits in the queue, namely the secret message 10. Noting
that l(−3) = 10 and that |ψ−1(−3 + 7)| = MA, she sends the
symbol xA(1) = −3, which encodes 10.
Now consider the second two bits in Alice’s queue, namely
11. Since l(−1) = 11 she must transmit the point xA = −1
to send this secret bit string. But since xB(2) = −5 and
|ψ−1(−1 − 5)| < MA, she instead selects xA(2) uniformly
at random from the other elements of XA during this time
instance, and waits to transmit 11.
During the third time instance, Alice sees that xB(3) = +5
and that |ψ−1(−1 + 5)| = MA, so she sends xA(3) = −1
which for the given value of xB encodes the final two secret
bits 11 in her queue. 
To study the effectiveness of our encoding scheme, we as
before set
∆A = |R̂s −RsA| =
2
MAMB
MA−1∑
a=1
a log2(a) (47)
and A = ∆A/R̂s to measure the absolute and relative failure
of RsA to achieve the upper bound. We plot ∆A in Fig. 10
and A in Fig. 11, as a function of MB for various values of
MA. As with the previous encoding scheme, both ∆A and A
approach 0 for fixed MA and increasing MB .
V. GENERALIZATION TO THE MIMO RELAY CHANNEL
This section removes the noiseless assumption and simul-
taneously generalizes to a MIMO channel in which Alice and
Bob each have N antennas and Ray has M ≥ N antennas.
We assume that Alice and Bob employ one of the encoders
discussed in Section IV. Having fixed a secrecy encoder, it
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Fig. 10. The gap ∆A = |R̂s −RsA| between Alice’s secrecy rate given the
encoding scheme of Section IV-B and the upper bound R̂s, as a function of
MB for various values of MB ≥ 4MA.
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is crucial to the success of Alice and Bob’s transmission that
Ray decode the sum xA + xB of their symbols correctly, a
point we now address by studying optimal precoding matrices
at Alice and Bob.
Let us denote the channel matrices Alice to Ray and Bob
to Ray by HA, HB ∈ CM×N , respectively, and the channel
matrices from Ray to Alice and Ray to Bob, respectively, by
H˜A and H˜B ∈ CN×M . We assume all matrices are selected
from a continuous distribution and are therefore full-rank with
probability 1.
Let d ≤ N and suppose Alice and Bob wish to transmit
realizations of length d random vectors XA and XB of
codewords. They employ linear precoders GA, GB ∈ CN×d,
so that Ray observes
Y = HAGAXA +HBGBXB +WR (48)
where WR is a length M vector of additive noise, with entries
i.i.d. zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian and
variance σ2R per complex dimension. To guarantee that Ray
only observes sums of information symbols, Alice and Bob
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then must construct GA and GB to satisfy
HAGA = HBGB (49)
so that given a realization of (48) Ray observes
y = HAGA(xA + xB) + wR (50)
from which he attempts to decode the sum xA + xB . Hence
condition (49) is crucial to employing the secrecy encoders of
the previous section.
We further impose power constraints on Alice and Bob by
first defining their average per-symbol power by
PA = E|xA,i|2, PB = E|xB,i|2 (51)
where xA = (xA,1, . . . , xA,d)T and xA,i ∈ XA, and similarly
for xB,i. To maintain this constraint after precoding we impose
the conditions
||GA||2F ≤ N, ||GB ||2F ≤ N. (52)
Here we recall that ||A||2F denotes the squared Frobenius norm
of a matrix A, defined by
∑
i σ
2
i , where σi are the singular
values of A. Note that assuming (49) and (51), and after
appropriate scaling of the channel matrices HA and HB , we
have that the average power of the received signal at Ray is
PR = PA + PB .
A. Degrees of Freedom
It is well-known and not hard to show (see [32], [37], [38])
that the degrees of freedom d of interference-free transmit
dimensions available to both Alice and Bob is bounded by
d ≤ (2N −M)+, and that every d satisfying this inequality
admits an interference-free transmission scheme. Let us recall
briefly how such schemes are constructed. Let HA and HB
be the column spans of HA and HB , respectively, so that
dimHA ∩ HB = (2N − M)+. If d ≤ (2N − M)+ then
Alice and Bob decide on a d-dimensional subspace S of
this intersection, and then choose N × d precoding matrices
GA, GB such that colspanHAGA = colspanHBGB = S. In
a similar manner, d ≤ (2N −M)+ guarantees that Ray can
transmit his PNC codewords back to Alice and Bob without
the loss of any signal dimensions.
To ensure successful encoding and decoding which maxi-
mizes the degrees of freedom, we therefore restrict to d, M ,
and N satisfying 1 ≤ d = 2N −M from now on.
B. The Dimension of the Space of Precoders
In this subsection we compute the dimension of the space
of all GA and GB satisfying the secrecy constraint (49) and
the power constraint (52). The dimension of this space mea-
sures the number of independent parameters when choosing
precoding matrices, and determines the difficulty of optimiz-
ing the precoders numerically. To be mathematically precise,
‘dimension’ here means ‘dimension as a real manifold’, but
we omit the mathematical technicalities in favor of exposition.
If GA and GB are any precoders such that ||GA||2F < N and
||GB ||2F < N , then we can always improve the performance
of the system by multiplying both precoders by a constant so
that either ||GA||2F = N or ||GB ||2F = N . So from now on
we assume that one of the inequalities in (52) is an equality.
On the other hand, the probability that both inequalities are
actually equalities, e.g. that both precoders can be chosen to
maximize both Alice and Bob’s transmit power and satisfy
(49), is zero.
Proposition 5: Fix N and M such that M/2 < N ≤M , let
d = 2N −M , and let HA, HB ∈ CM×N be generic full-rank
matrices. Consider the matrix equation HAGA = HBGB for
some variable matrices GA, GB ∈ CN×d such that ||GA||2F ≤
N or ||GB ||2F ≤ N , and that exactly one of these inequalities
is an equality. Then
dimR P = 2(d2 − 1). (53)
where dimR denotes dimension as a real manifold and P is
the space of all such GA, GB satisfying the above conditions.
Proof: As a real Euclidean space, the dimension of the
space of all pairs GA, GB ∈ CN×d is 4Nd. Accounting for
both real and imaginary parts, the equation HAGA−HBGB =
0 defines 2Md linear equations in the entries of GA, GB , all
of which are independent by the assumptions that HA and
HB are generic and full-rank. Furthermore, suppose without
loss of generality that ||GA||2F = N . This single additional
quadratic equation further reduces the dimension of the total
space by two. Putting this all together gives us dimR P =
4Nd− 2Md− 2 = 2(d2 − 1) as claimed.
Thus when the degrees of freedom of the system is
maximized, we have dimP = 2(d2 − 1) dimensions to
optimize over when constructing optimal precoders. When
(M,N) = (3, 2) or (5, 3), for example, the dimension of P
is zero and thus P consists of only isolated points, meaning
that additional steepest descent optimization cannot improve
system performance.
C. Optimizing Precoders at Alice and Bob
While the previous section addressed the difficulty of opti-
mizing precoders, in this subsection we address exactly what
objective functions should be optimized. Successful transmis-
sion between Alice and Bob requires Ray to accurately detect
the sum xA + xB . That is, assuming the secrecy constraint
HAGA = HBGB is satisfied, GA and GB should then be
designed to maximize the mutual information at Ray. We see
that the task at hand is the following optimization problem:
maximize
GA,GB
I(Y ;XA +XB)
subject to
ß
max{||GA||2F , ||GB ||2F } ≤ N
HAGB = HBGB
(54)
where Y = HAGAXA + HBGBXB + WR as before. No-
tice that the constraints exactly describe the space P of all
precoders studied in Proposition 5.
It is important to note that the goal of the above optimization
problem is not to increase the secrecy rate for either Alice
or Bob, as the protocols of the previous section have already
fixed this quantity. Rather, we seek to increase the overall data
rate of the total received signal at Ray, subject to the secrecy
constraints.
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1) Zero-forcing precoders: A straightforward zero-forcing
scheme which satisfies the power and secrecy constraints of
(54) is the following. Let
ï
EA
−EB
ò
be a 2N × d matrix whose
columns form a basis of the right nullspace of the M × 2N
block matrix [HA HB ]. Now set
GA =
√
NEA/γ, GB =
√
NEB/γ
γ = max{||EA||F , ||EB ||F }
(55)
and it follows immediately that HAGA = HBGB as desired.
When N = M = d, we can take GA =
√
NH−1A /γ and
GB =
√
NH−1B /γ, where γ = max{||H−1A ||F , ||H−1B ||F }.
Every pair GA, GB of precoding matrices satisfying the
secrecy and power constraint can be constructed via the above
process. However, for certain parameters of M and N , one
can further optimize some initial zero-forcing scheme.
2) Relaxation using the gap approximation: As an attempt
at an improvement on the above scheme, let us suppose that
the power and secrecy constraints of (54) are satisfied and use
the gap approximation to approximate I(Y ;XA+XB) by the
channel capacity:
C(HA,HB) ≈ I(Y ;XA +XB) + Γ (56)
where Γ is a constant. By a well-known formula [39], the
channel capacity (for fixed HA, HB) is then
C(HA,HB) = log2 det
Å
IM +
PA + PB
σ2R
HAGAG
†
AH
†
A
ã
(57)
The relaxation of the optimization problem at hand is then
to maximize C(HA,HB) over all pairs (GA, GB) subject to the
same constraints of (54). At first glance HB and GB are absent
from this expression, but recall that we have already assumed
that HAGA = HBGB .
To optimize (57) numerically, one performs steepest descent
as follows. Let G =
ï
GA
GB
ò
, so that the task is to optimize over
all possible G satisfying the power and secrecy constraints.
The constraints of (54) restrict the set of all possible G to
a bounded region of N = null [HA −HB]. One performs
steepest descent on the coordinates of G as normal, but after
every iteration replaces G with the projection ProjNG and
scales both blocks of G to satisfy the power constraint of
(54). We omit further details.
In Fig. 12 we plot the channel capacity (57). Here the “zero-
forcing” precoders were found according to (55). The “gap
approximation” precoders were then numerically optimized
according to (57), and results were averaged over 103 pairs
(HA, HB) of channel matrices. The entries of HA and HB
were drawn from i.i.d. complex zero-mean circularly symmet-
ric Gaussian distributions with variance 1/M .
The most notable feature of Fig. 12 is that further optimiza-
tion improves the precoding schemes for (M,N) = (3, 3)
and (4, 3) quite a bit, but offers no improvement for the
other two cases. This is explained by Proposition 5, since
only for these parameters is dimR P = 2(d2 − 1) > 0.
Secondly, the performance of the gap approximation precoder
for (M,N) = (4, 3) is better than that of the zero-forcing
precoder for (M,N) = (3, 3), even though the second scheme
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Fig. 12. The expected ergodic capacity E(HA,HB)C(HA,HB) as computed
by (57) for randomly chosen zero-forcing precoders of (55), and those which
have been further optimized using the gap approximation (57) of the mutual
information I(Y ;XA +XB).
offers an additional degree of freedom. Hence at the practical,
finite SNR regimes of interest, specific precoding matrices may
have more impact on capacity than the degrees of freedom.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have studied the potential for perfect secrecy in a single-
relay network with two users. Given finite, uniform input
distributions, we have calculated upper bounds for the perfect
secrecy rates under the assumptions that one user does or does
not have information about the other user’s signal, made these
upper bounds explicit for PAM modems, and discussed the
impact of synchronization errors on secrecy. Two schemes
that achieve perfect secrecy were presented using standard
M -PAM modulators, one which assumes no cooperation be-
tween the users, and one which assumes the user with the
smaller constellation knows the other user’s signal. Gaps to
the relevant upper bounds were shown to be small, especially
asymptotically as the size of the larger constellation increases.
The system was generalized to a MIMO setting, and precoding
matrices maintaining the required secrecy constraints were
studied. Finally, the potential for lattice encoders, alternative
power allocation schemes, and applications to larger relay
networks will be examined in the future.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: We first show that the UBs in the noiseless
scenario are given by
R̂sA = mA − I(Y ;XA), R̂sB = mB − I(Y ;XB). (58)
To see this note that in the noiseless scenario, the assump-
tions of Section II guarantee that I(YB ;XA|XB) = mA, as
Alice’s symbol is perfectly recoverable given Bob’s observa-
tion. Furthermore, the noiseless assumption guarantees that
H(XA|YB , XB) = 0, and thus (58) for R̂sA follows directly by
substitution into (13). The result for Bob follows by symmetry.
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By the above it suffices to compute the mutual information
I(Y ;XA). We first fix a single xA ∈ XA and compute the
marginal mutual information I(Y ;xA). An easy computation
reveals that the joint distribution (Y,XA) has pmf
pY,XA(y, xA) =
|ψ−1(y) ∩ ({xA} × XB) |
MAMB
=
ß
0, ψ−1(y) ∩ ({xA} × XB) = ∅
1
MAMB
, otherwise
Computing the mutual information I(Y ;xA) now gives
I(Y ;xA) =
∑
y∈Y
pY,XA(y, xA) log2
Å
pY,XA(y, xA)
pY (y)pXA(xA)
ã
=
∑
y∈Y
y∈xA+XB
1
MAMB
log2
MA
|ψ−1(y)| (59)
Summing up over all xA, we arrive at
I(Y ;XA) =
∑
xA∈XA
I(Y ;xA)
= mA −
∑
xA∈XA
∑
y∈Y
y∈xA+XB
log2 |ψ−1(y)|
MAMB
= mA −
∑
y∈Y
|ψ−1(y)|
MAMB
log2 |ψ−1(y)| (60)
where the last equality follows by grouping like summands
together. An analogous calculation holds for Bob, and the
proposition follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Define S =
∑
y∈Y |ψ−1(y)| log2 |ψ−1(y)|. We
can use the explicit formula for |ψ−1(y)| from Proposition
3 to write S as S = F + L where
F =
MB−MA∑
y=−(MB−MA)
y even
mAMA
L = 2
MB+MA−2∑
y=MB−MA+2
y even
MB +MA − y
2
log2
Å
MB +MA − y
2
ã
The number of even integers in the interval [−(MB −
MA),MB − MA] is exactly MB − MA + 1, and hence
F = mAMA(MB − MA + 1). Making the change of
variables a = MB+MA−y2 transforms the sum L into L =
2
∑MA−1
a=1 a log2(a). We can conclude the proof by recalling
that R̂s = S/MAMB = (F + L)/MAMB , which is easily
shown to be equal to the quantity in the theorem given the
above calculations.
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